Hormuz Crisis Week 3: 50% of Global PE Supply Disrupted, Prices Spike 50-80%

Pedro Zaccaria
Head of Technology


Part 3 of the Hormuz Crisis series: Week 1 | Week 2 | Week 3 (this article)
This week, both sides in the Iran war crossed a line that changes everything: they started bombing each other’s energy production facilities. Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gasfield—the world’s largest natural gas reserve. Iran retaliated by hitting Qatar’s Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG terminal, cutting 17% of Qatar’s capacity with a 3–5 year recovery timeline. A drone struck UAE’s Shah gasfield. The damage is no longer temporary—it is structural.
What began three weeks ago as a supply shock from the Strait of Hormuz closure, and escalated in Week 2 into a $30 oil swing and cascading production shutdowns, has now become an availability crisis. Roughly half of global polyethylene capacity is either directly offline or indirectly constrained through feedstock shortages, according to both BIC Advisory Group and Dow CEO Jim Fitterling. PE and PP prices have surged 50–80% in some markets. Force majeures have cascaded from the Gulf to Asia to Europe. And there is no diplomatic exit in sight.
Key Numbers This Week
| Metric | Week 3 Status (March 20) |
|---|---|
| Global PE capacity disrupted | ~50% (direct + feedstock-constrained) |
| Brent crude | $108–110/bbl (+54% monthly) |
| Hormuz traffic decline | ~95% (5–6 ships/day vs. 138 pre-war) |
| Force majeures declared | 34+ (31 Asia/ME, 2 Europe, 1 Americas) |
| US PE price increase (cumulative) | 35 c/lb through May (LyondellBasell) |
| India PE price increase (cumulative) | INR 35,000–50,000/MT |
| Key new development | Both sides targeting energy production infrastructure |
How the Crisis Has Evolved
| Metric | Week 1 (Mar 4) | Week 2 (Mar 10) | Week 3 (Mar 20) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brent crude | $81/bbl | $90–120/bbl | $108–110/bbl (physical Dubai >$150) |
| Hormuz status | Closure announced | ~90% traffic drop | ~95% traffic drop; 40,000 seafarers stranded |
| PE capacity offline | Iran’s 1.125M tons at risk | Gulf shutdowns begin | ~50% of global capacity disrupted |
| Force majeures | QatarEnergy | Cascading Gulf FMs | 34+ across 3 continents |
| Key price signal | Naphtha +$79/MT in one session | India PE +INR 20,000/MT | US +35 c/lb cumulative; India +INR 50,000/MT |
| Diplomatic outlook | IRGC declares Hormuz closed | Trump signals “very complete” | No ceasefire talks; new Supreme Leader rejects de-escalation |
The War Moved to Energy Infrastructure
Week 3’s big shift: both sides started hitting upstream energy production. Previous weeks targeted military installations and shipping. Now the war is hitting the wells, gasfields, and LNG terminals that feed the global petrochemical supply chain.
Timeline of Major Infrastructure Attacks
| Date | Target | Attacker | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| March 17 | UAE Shah gasfield (one of world’s largest) | Iranian drone | Production disrupted; Brent +2.3% |
| March 17 | Iraq’s Majnoon oilfield | Iran-aligned forces | Field operations suspended |
| March 17 | Fujairah port infrastructure | Iranian strike | Further port congestion |
| March 18 | Iran’s South Pars gasfield (world’s largest natural gas reserve) | Israeli strike | Brent spiked >5% to ~$110/bbl |
| March 18–19 | Qatar’s Ras Laffan (world’s largest LNG facility) | Iranian retaliation | 17% of Qatar LNG capacity cut; $20B/yr revenue loss; 3–5 year recovery |
| March 19 | Kuwait refinery | Iranian strike | Fuel production disrupted |
Sources: The Guardian, Fortune, Al Jazeera, Reuters
Ras Laffan matters because Qatar is not just an LNG exporter. QatarEnergy declared force majeure on all 77.4 million tonnes per year of LNG capacity. With Qatar also a major PE and PP exporter, the damage compounds an already dire supply picture. The estimated 3–5 year recovery timeline means this is no longer a temporary disruption—it is a permanent change to Gulf energy infrastructure.
“Iran published a list of Middle East petrochemical facilities that could be targeted in retaliation, covering approximately 32% of the region’s olefin supply, 42% of PE capacity, and 40% of PP capacity.”
— S&P Global Commodity Insights, March 14, 2026
Brent Crude and Naphtha: The Feedstock Crisis Deepens
Brent crude settled at $108–110 per barrel on March 20, up approximately 54% month-over-month, according to TradingEconomics. But the headline Brent number obscures a far more severe reality in physical markets.
Regional Crude Premiums: An Unprecedented Divergence
| Benchmark | Price (March 17–20) | Change |
|---|---|---|
| Brent crude (ICE futures) | $108–110/bbl | +54% month-over-month |
| WTI crude | $95–97/bbl | +43% month-over-month |
| Dubai crude (physical) | >$150/bbl (all-time high) | WTI-Dubai spread: $50+ (normally $5–8) |
| Oman crude (DME) | >$152/bbl | Record settlement |
| Naphtha (C&F Japan) | $861/MT | +52% month-over-month |
| Naphtha (NWE physical) | $689/MT | +19% from late February |
Sources: TradingEconomics, Fortune, Financial Times
The divergence between paper Brent ($110) and physical Asian crude ($150+) is what matters for PE producers. As Vandana Hari of Vanda Insights told Al Jazeera: physical crude in Asia is trading at a $40 premium over paper equivalents—a gap that’s “without precedent.”
For naphtha-based PE producers across Asia and Europe, this is devastating. Naphtha prices surged to $861 per metric ton, up 52% in a single month, per TradingEconomics. Fujairah light distillate stocks (gasoline and naphtha) plummeted 29% in a single week, according to Argus Media. China halted all oil product exports (except to Hong Kong and Macau) to secure domestic supply, per S&P Global.
The IEA’s March Oil Market Report quantified the damage:
- 8 mb/d global oil supply plunge in March
- 20 mb/d of crude and product exports disrupted
- 3+ mb/d of Gulf refining capacity shut down, with 4+ mb/d at risk
- 70,000 b/d of naphtha diverted as an LPG substitute, tightening petrochemical feedstock further
PE and PP Price Spiral: A Region-by-Region Breakdown
Increases are now measured in multiples, not percentages. Naphtha-dependent producers are hit hardest, but every region is paying more—the only question is how much.
United States: 35 Cents per Pound Cumulative
LyondellBasell issued the biggest pricing move in the U.S.: 10 c/lb for March, 15 c/lb for April, and 10 c/lb for May—a cumulative 35 cents per pound increase through May. CFO Agustin Izquierdo stated at the J.P. Morgan Industrials Conference: “10 cents per pound is not scaring anybody. We still see a healthy number of orders in the books.” When a producer publicly signals that double-digit price increases aren’t slowing demand, buyers should read that as confirmation that further increases are coming.
Dow announced $0.10/lb for March and $0.15/lb for April in North America. CEO Jim Fitterling confirmed “price increases in every business in every region” for March. U.S. HDPE Injection Moulding (Pail Grade) FOB Texas surged 36.57% in early March, per ChemAnalyst. Spot ethylene hit 30.25 cents per pound, the highest since February 2025, per Bloomberg.
Europe: EUR 200–500 per Tonne and Rising
European PE suppliers began March with increases of EUR 200 per tonne, which initially drew disbelief but were quickly accepted as the supply picture deteriorated. By mid-March, price requests had escalated to EUR 400–600 per tonne depending on grade, with rumors of planned increases exceeding EUR 500/MT, per Plastribution. PP homopolymer injection-grade FD NWE spot reached EUR 1,200/MT, up EUR 220/MT since the start of March, per S&P Global Platts.
“Presently, securing sufficient material is of greater concern than what it costs. Even if the conflict is resolved quickly, it will be many months before the supply chain returns to anything like normality.”
— Plastribution UK, March 12, 2026
India: INR 35,000–50,000 per MT Cumulative
Reliance Industries raised PE prices three times in eight days. By the third round on March 11, LLDPE and HDPE had jumped a combined INR 45,000–50,000/MT depending on grade, with LDPE up to INR 52,000/MT, per Plastemart. Indian Oil matched with four rounds of its own, hitting INR 44,000–45,000/MT across PE grades.
The result: Indian polymer prices are up roughly 43% since the war began, per S&P Global, with spot prices spiking 100–150% above pre-crisis levels in some grades. Plastic end-product prices are expected to follow, rising 50–60% from April, per MoneyControl. New Delhi is now directing gas distributors to curtail supplies to petrochemical plants, prioritizing domestic fuel, per Argus Media.
Asia, Africa, and Latin America
| Region | Product | Price Movement | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Far East Asia | PP injection CFR | $1,180/MT (+$330 since March 2) | S&P Global Platts |
| China (Dalian) | Polyethylene | 8,737 CNY/T (+28.75% monthly) | TradingEconomics |
| China (East) | LLDPE export | $1,030/MT | SunSirs |
| North Africa | PP raffia CFR | $1,290/MT (+$190/wk, biggest weekly jump on record) | S&P Global Platts |
| West Africa | PP raffia CFR | +39% since conflict began | S&P Global Platts |
| Brazil | PE (all grades) | +R$500/MT (Braskem, March 2) | S&P Global / Argus |
| Brazil | PP | +R$250/MT (Braskem, March 2) | S&P Global / Argus |
| South Korea | Naphtha crackers | LG Chem cut to 60% minimum rates | S&P Global |
The Force Majeure Cascade: From the Gulf to Every Continent
A force majeure declaration is a contractual provision releasing a producer from delivery obligations due to extraordinary events beyond their control. In petrochemical markets, it signals that a supplier cannot fulfill existing contracts, so buyers must find alternative sources or accept delayed delivery. The pattern of these declarations tells the story of contagion. Force majeures started in the Gulf (direct impact from the Hormuz closure and military strikes), spread to Asia (as naphtha feedstock from the Gulf dried up, starving crackers in Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea), then reached Europe (hit by both soaring feedstock costs and the loss of Middle Eastern PE/PP imports). The naphtha-dependent producers are most exposed: Asian producers that might fill the European gap rely on the same Gulf naphtha for their crackers. They cannot increase output when their own feedstock is constrained.
As of March 13, ICIS counted 31 force majeure or sales allocation announcements for chemicals in Asia and the Middle East, 2 in Europe, and 1 in the Americas—with more issued daily since. Morgan Stanley’s Force Majeure Tracker (March 13) quantified the scale: 3.9% of global ethylene capacity under force majeure (up 1.7 percentage points week over week), 3.2% of propylene, 1.4% of PE, and 1.0% of PP. These headline numbers understate the actual disruption because they exclude voluntary rate cuts, government-directed curtailments, and the vast Middle Eastern capacity that simply cannot ship.
Major Force Majeure and Shutdown Declarations
| Company | Location | Capacity Affected | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| QatarEnergy | Qatar (Ras Laffan) | 77.4 Mt/yr LNG + PE/PP | March 18 |
| LyondellBasell | Europe (Rotterdam) | European polyolefin production | March 13 |
| Formosa Petrochemical | Taiwan (Mailiao) | 2.93 Mt/yr ethylene, 2.43 Mt/yr propylene | March 9 |
| Formosa Plastics | Taiwan | ~970,000 t/yr NE Asia PE | March 12 |
| PT Chandra Asri | Indonesia | 755,000 t/yr PE + 590,000 t/yr PP | March 2 |
| Aster Chemicals (ex-Shell) | Singapore | 1.15 Mt/yr ethylene + 500,000 t/yr propylene | March 6 |
| OMV | Germany (Burghausen) | 485,000 t/yr ethylene + 225,000 t/yr propylene | March ~10 |
| Orlen | Poland (Plock) | 700,000 t/yr ethylene + 385,000 t/yr propylene | March ~10 |
| LG Chem | South Korea (Yeosu/Daesan) | Cut to 60% minimum at all naphtha crackers | March ~14 |
| INEOS Inovyn | Europe | PE + PVC exports | March ~10 |
| Indian Govt directive | India (OPaL, GAIL Pata, Reliance) | Gas curtailment to petchem plants | March 16 |
Sources: Morgan Stanley via Bitget, S&P Global, ICIS, Argus Media
As Plastribution noted, PP is especially difficult to replace globally because every alternative supply route runs through the same bottleneck: Middle Eastern naphtha.
North America Emerges as the World’s Swing Supplier
With roughly half of global PE capacity offline or constrained, North America’s ethane-based producers have become the world’s most important swing supplier. The structural advantage comes down to feedstock. A naphtha cracker is a petrochemical plant that uses naphtha (a liquid hydrocarbon derived from crude oil) as its primary feedstock to produce ethylene and propylene, the building blocks of PE and PP. Most crackers in Asia and Europe run on naphtha, making them directly exposed to oil price movements. U.S. crackers, by contrast, run on domestically produced ethane (tied to natural gas prices). Natural gas prices have barely moved. Oil has doubled. This is the oil-to-gas spread (the cost difference between crude oil-derived naphtha and natural gas-derived ethane), and it has blown wide open.
“Our big advantage in the Americas is light cracking ethane. Ethane fundamentals haven’t changed, but oil fundamentals have changed dramatically. That’s widened the oil-to-gas spread. About 40% of the world’s naphtha comes from the Gulf. It either comes from the Gulf or from crude out of the Gulf.”
— Jim Fitterling, CEO, Dow Inc., J.P. Morgan Industrials Conference, March 18, 2026
Dow’s Americas crackers are running at 90%+ operating rates. Fitterling confirmed that “everything that we’ve got running is going to be flat out for the rest of the year.” About 30% of U.S. PE capacity is export-oriented, and with the oil-to-gas spread widening dramatically, U.S. exports are “even more in the money.”
LyondellBasell CFO Agustin Izquierdo was equally bullish: “We have demand everywhere—healthy demand for U.S. product out of Europe, Latin America, and Africa due to supply disruptions in the Middle East. We have an opportunity to start exporting out of North America. That is very leveraging for us.”
As Octus Credit Research summarized: “In the U.S., the structural advantage of ethane-based cracking insulates domestic producers from direct naphtha feedstock disruption. North American natural gas prices have been essentially unchanged, significantly widening the energy cost advantage.”
The Winter Storm Uri Comparison
Sleiman Bassila of BIC Advisory Group, a 25-year ExxonMobil veteran, drew a direct comparison to Winter Storm Uri (February 2021). Uri temporarily removed about one-sixth of global PE capacity for five days. Prices rose 37 cents per pound over six to seven months (from the mid-40s to mid-90s per pound), peaked six months later, and took nearly two years to normalize.
The current disruption has knocked out ~19 million tonnes per year of Middle Eastern PE capacity directly, with an additional ~61 million tonnes indirectly affected through feedstock shortages. Bassila’s assessment: this crisis is “deeper, broader, and longer in duration” than Uri. Even if resolved today, he expects “short, medium, and long-term repercussions—for a month on prices, for years in terms of readjusting trade routes.”
Pre-crisis, North American PE inventories were already at 37 days of supply versus a balanced level of 45 days, per LyondellBasell. Industry inventories remain well below the five-year average, reflecting three years of destocking. This leaves minimal buffer for a demand surge.
The Diplomatic Dead End: No Ceasefire in Sight
The supply outlook depends entirely on diplomacy, and diplomacy has stalled. As of March 20, there are no active ceasefire negotiations. Both sides have hardened their positions.
The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed. BBC Verify, citing Kpler shipping analytics, reported that only 99 vessels have passed through the Strait in the entire month of March—averaging 5–6 per day versus the pre-war rate of 138 per day, a ~95% decline in daily traffic. Most of those crossings were ships with Iranian or Chinese connections, often with AIS tracking switched off.
| Party | Position | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Trump administration | “He’s not interested [in ceasefire talks] right now, and we’re going to continue with the mission unabated.” | Reuters, March 14 |
| IRGC | “The Guards will not accept any ceasefire, ceasefire talks, or diplomatic efforts. If they lose control over the Strait of Hormuz, Iran will lose the war.” | Reuters, March 14 |
| New Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei | Rejected de-escalation proposals conveyed by intermediaries | Reuters, March 17 |
| Oman (mediator) | Multiple attempts to open communication; White House declined | Reuters, March 14 |
Sources: Reuters, BBC Verify, CNN
Behind the statistics are real people. An estimated 40,000 seafarers remain stranded on ships on both sides of the Strait, per Bloomberg. They have been trapped for three weeks with drones, cruise missiles, and fighter jets visible overhead, according to BBC reporters on the scene. More than 120 container ships and 150+ tankers sit at anchor in Gulf waters, their cargo and crews waiting for a resolution that shows no sign of arriving. War risk insurance premiums have reached ~5% of ship value—roughly $5 million to insure a $100 million tanker, per Insurance Journal. The U.S. announced a $20 billion reinsurance program through the DFC to try to revive shipping, but details remain unclear and the program is unlikely to restart traffic without addressing the underlying security situation.
Fed Chair Jay Powell, in his March 19 press briefing, used the word “uncertainty” seven times: “The truth is it is completely out of our hands. Like everybody else, we have to wait and see what happens.”
What Happens Next: Three Scenarios for Q2 2026
The PE market outlook for the rest of Q2 hinges on the Hormuz situation. Here are three scenarios and their likely impact on polyethylene supply and pricing:
| Scenario | Timeframe | PE Price Impact | Supply Recovery |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quick resolution — ceasefire + Hormuz reopens by mid-April | 2–4 weeks | Prices stabilize but remain elevated (+15–20 c/lb above pre-crisis) through Q2. Gradual normalization over 6–12 months. | Shipping resumes within weeks, but production restarts take 1–3 months. Damaged infrastructure (Ras Laffan, South Pars) takes years. |
| Prolonged closure — no ceasefire through May; Hormuz remains shut | 2–3 months | Prices peak at +40–50 c/lb above pre-crisis. Some demand destruction as converters pass costs or idle lines. Echoes Winter Storm Uri trajectory. | North America runs flat out but cannot replace Gulf volumes. Force majeures spread further. Spot availability near zero in some grades. |
| Escalation — attacks on additional Gulf production; Iran targets Saudi Aramco or ADNOC upstream | 3+ months | Brent potentially reaches $140–150+/bbl. PE prices could double from pre-crisis levels. Demand destruction becomes the primary price ceiling. | Global recession risk rises sharply. IMF estimates every sustained 10% rise in oil prices costs 0.15% of global GDP. PE market restructures around non-Gulf supply for years. |
BIC Advisory Group’s Sleiman Bassila put it bluntly: even the best-case scenario leaves repercussions lasting “months for prices, years for trade routes.” Procurement teams should plan for Scenario 2 while hoping for Scenario 1.
Buyer Action Plan: What to Do Right Now
The shift from price shock to availability crisis demands a different playbook than the one recommended in Week 2. Here are six priority actions for PE and PP buyers:
- Secure volume before price. The market has inverted: availability is the constraint, not cost. Buyers who wait for “better pricing” are finding that offers evaporate. As Plastics Exchange reported, buyers that tried to negotiate even a half-cent saw opportunities vanish and came back to pay the next (higher) offer.
- Explore North American supply. U.S. ethane-based producers are running flat out and actively seeking export demand. With Middle Eastern supply offline and Asian naphtha-based producers cutting rates, the Americas are the primary source of incremental PE globally. Inquire about spot availability now—volumes are tightening fast.
- Use the Dubai-Oman Green Corridor. Dubai Customs activated a Green Corridor with Oman (Customs Notice No. 04/2026) that bypasses Hormuz entirely. Goods arrive at Oman’s Indian Ocean-facing ports (Sohar, Salalah—outside the Strait), clear Omani customs, and move by road through Al Wajajah → Hatta into Dubai. It is bidirectional and covers local market and Free Zone shipments. CMA CGM has already launched a shuttle loop from India to Sohar, Fujairah, and Khor Fakkan. Confirm your HS codes are eligible (some are excluded) and establish logistics relationships now.
- Monitor China’s re-export window. Chinese PE inventory is declining but LLDPE export prices from East China are at $1,030/MT. For buyers in Southeast Asia, Latin America, or Africa who previously relied on Middle Eastern supply, Chinese re-exports may offer a partial substitute—but the window may narrow as Chinese domestic demand absorbs surplus.
- Extend procurement horizons beyond Q2. In Week 2, we recommended preparing for multi-week disruption. That guidance is now insufficient. With both sides attacking energy infrastructure (3–5 year recovery for Ras Laffan alone), supply chains will not snap back even after a ceasefire. Lock in Q2 and Q3 volumes where possible. Bassila’s assessment: repercussions lasting “months for prices, years for trade routes.”
- Build permanent multi-geography supply relationships. In Week 2, we recommended diversifying away from Gulf dependence. This week’s force majeure cascade from Asia to Europe shows that naphtha-dependent producers in any region are vulnerable. The durable hedge is relationships with ethane-based Americas producers, plus non-Gulf Asian and European suppliers with diverse feedstock access.
How Syntex America Can Help
Syntex America has active relationships with U.S. ethane-based PE producers currently running at maximum capacity and seeking export demand. We can help you source polyethylene and polypropylene through our Americas-based trading desk, arrange freight forwarding on routes unaffected by the Hormuz closure, structure financing terms for larger crisis-period purchases, and handle customs clearance across Latin America. Our team is monitoring allocation availability and pricing daily. Contact us to discuss your specific supply needs for Q2.
Sources and Methodology
This analysis synthesizes data from 25+ sources including the IEA Oil Market Report, S&P Global Commodity Insights, ICIS, Argus Media, Reuters, Bloomberg, and the Financial Times, plus primary executive statements from LyondellBasell and Dow investor presentations at the J.P. Morgan Industrials Conference (March 17–18, 2026). Price data is sourced from TradingEconomics, ChemAnalyst, and S&P Global Platts assessments. Force majeure tracking draws on Morgan Stanley’s global tracker and ICIS declarations database. All data points are as of March 20, 2026, unless otherwise noted.
Frequently Asked Questions
Approximately 50% of global polyethylene capacity is either directly offline or indirectly constrained through feedstock shortages, according to assessments from both BIC Advisory Group and Dow CEO Jim Fitterling. About 19 million tonnes per year of Middle Eastern PE capacity is directly shut down, with an additional 61 million tonnes indirectly affected because naphtha feedstock from the Gulf feeds crackers across Asia and Europe. Morgan Stanley's Force Majeure Tracker reported 3.9% of global ethylene capacity and 1.4% of global PE capacity formally under force majeure as of March 13, though these figures exclude voluntary rate cuts and government-directed curtailments.
PE prices have surged 50-80% in some markets within three weeks. In the United States, LyondellBasell announced cumulative increases of 35 cents per pound through May 2026. US HDPE surged 36.57% in early March. In Europe, PE price increases reached EUR 200-500 per tonne. In India, cumulative increases hit INR 35,000-50,000 per metric ton depending on grade, with spot prices spiking 100-150% above pre-crisis levels. In Asia, PP injection CFR Far East rose $330 per metric ton since March 2. In Africa, PP raffia prices jumped 39% since the conflict began.
As of mid-March 2026, ICIS counted 31 force majeure or sales allocation announcements for chemicals in Asia and the Middle East, 2 in Europe, and 1 in the Americas. Major declarations include QatarEnergy on 77.4 million tonnes per year of LNG and petrochemicals; LyondellBasell on European polyolefin production; Formosa Petrochemical on 2.93 million tonnes per year of ethylene in Taiwan; PT Chandra Asri on 755,000 tonnes per year of PE in Indonesia; Aster Chemicals on 1.15 million tonnes per year of ethylene in Singapore; and LG Chem cutting to 60% minimum operating rates at all naphtha-fed crackers in South Korea.
North American PE producers use domestically produced ethane as feedstock, which is tied to natural gas prices rather than crude oil. Natural gas prices have barely moved during the crisis while oil has roughly doubled, dramatically widening the cost advantage for U.S. ethane-based crackers. About 30% of U.S. PE capacity is export-oriented. With Middle Eastern supply offline and Asian naphtha-based producers cutting rates due to feedstock shortages, the Americas are the primary source of incremental PE globally. Dow confirmed its crackers are running at 90%+ rates and will be 'flat out for the rest of the year.'
The Dubai-Oman Green Corridor, activated under Dubai Customs Notice No. 04/2026, is a streamlined land-based trade route that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. Goods arriving at Oman's Indian Ocean-facing seaports (Sohar, Salalah) are cleared under Omani customs, sealed in containers, and transported by road through the Al Wajajah (Oman) to Hatta (Dubai/UAE) border crossing. The corridor is bidirectional and covers both local market and Free Zone shipments. It enables resin cargo to reach Dubai without transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Some HS codes are excluded.
As of March 20, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed. BBC Verify, citing Kpler shipping analytics, reported that only 99 vessels passed through the entire month of March, averaging 5-6 per day versus the pre-war rate of 138 per day — a roughly 95% decline. Most crossings involved Iranian-linked or Chinese-linked vessels, often with AIS tracking disabled. There are no active ceasefire negotiations. The Trump administration rejected ceasefire efforts, and Iran's IRGC stated it will not accept any ceasefire. War risk insurance premiums have reached approximately 5% of ship value.
Winter Storm Uri in February 2021 temporarily removed about one-sixth of global polyethylene capacity for five days. Prices rose 37 cents per pound over six to seven months and took nearly two years to normalize. The current Hormuz crisis has knocked out approximately 19 million tonnes per year of PE capacity directly — more than Uri — with an additional 61 million tonnes indirectly affected. According to BIC Advisory Group founder Sleiman Bassila, this disruption is 'deeper, broader, and longer in duration' than Uri, with no defined timeline for resolution.
Buyers should prioritize securing volume over negotiating price, as availability is now the primary constraint. Explore North American ethane-based PE supply, which remains the most insulated from the crisis. Evaluate the Dubai-Oman Green Corridor for UAE imports and exports. Monitor China's PE re-export window. Plan for prolonged disruption by extending procurement horizons and locking in Q2 volumes. Permanently diversify supplier bases across multiple geographies to reduce concentration risk in any single producing region.
Indian polymer prices surged approximately 43% since the war began on February 28, 2026. Reliance Industries issued three rounds of increases between March 3 and March 11, with cumulative PE hikes of INR 35,000-50,000 per metric ton depending on grade. Indian Oil matched with similar increases across four rounds. Spot market prices spiked 100-150% above pre-crisis levels. The Indian government directed gas distributors to curtail gas supplies to petrochemical plants, prioritizing domestic fuel. Plastic end-product prices are expected to rise 50-60% from April.
The Q2 2026 PE outlook depends heavily on the Hormuz situation. With no ceasefire talks underway and both sides attacking energy infrastructure, supply disruptions are likely to persist well into Q2. BIC Advisory Group expects price and supply repercussions lasting months even if the crisis resolves quickly, with trade route adjustments taking years. Analyst forecasts for Brent crude range from $85-115 per barrel for Q2, keeping naphtha costs elevated. North American producers are expected to run at maximum capacity. The EIA forecasts Brent above $95 per barrel for the next two months, falling below $80 only in Q3 if the conflict ends.



